

Örnek

Form

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EĞİTİM

2017-2018	Ph.D. in Economics	BRISKOLLEGE, USA
2017-2018	M.Sc. in Economics Tez konusu: "Resolving the Health Status Problem in Turkey" Tez başlığı: "Resolving the Health Status Problem in Turkey"	BRISKOLLEGE, TURKEY
2011-2017	BA in Economics	BRISKOLLEGE, TURKEY
2011-2017	BS in Mathematics Tez konusu: "Resolving the Health Status Problem in Turkey"	BRISKOLLEGE, TURKEY

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TEKNOLOJİ

Behavioral Market Design, Experimental Economics, Game Economics, Health Status Design

YAYINLAR

SAĞLIK VE HAYAT (JFM)

Behavioral market design experiments are commonly used throughout the world in important markets to increase their incentive compatibility. To guarantee the analysis of existing data as well as to make experiments, I show that behavioral market design is theoretically "strategy-proof", meaning that it does not allow for a strategy-proof design, i.e. the behavioral market design is "strategy-proof", and allowing to be represented as a market program. I discuss the general theory of market design in the context of health status design and experimental data from US health status. In this setting, health status design is more likely than the traditional market design to be strategy-proof. In an experiment with 100 subjects, I aim to test the theoretical predictions for this general social choice mechanism. Participants are informed of their own health status and their preferences for health status. I show that participants are more likely to report their true health status when the market design is strategy-proof than when it is not. This result is robust to various specifications of the market design. I also show that participants are more likely to report their true health status when the market design is strategy-proof than when it is not. This result is robust to various specifications of the market design. I also show that participants are more likely to report their true health status when the market design is strategy-proof than when it is not. This result is robust to various specifications of the market design.

RESEARCH INTERESTS: HEALTH STATUS DESIGN

with Lucas Ogram

INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND MARKET DESIGN: AN APPLICATION

CERTIFICATES

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